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1. Introduction 
A critical problem facing a would-be entrepreneur is whether he has enough capital to 
start his business. If his access to outside finance is restricted, his personal wealth cer-
tainly would play a significant role in meeting the initial capital requirement. As a result, 
a positive relationship between personal wealth and entry into self-employment provides 
prima facie evidence that financial constraints affect new business formation. Based on 
this logic, early empirical work, normally using net family assets to measure wealth, con-
sistently finds evidence of liquidity constraints in entrepreneurship (Evans and Jovanovic 
[1989], Evans and Leighton [1989]). However, as widely noted in subsequent studies, 
household assets are not an exogenous proxy for wealth. They are positively correlated 
with unobserved entrepreneurial ability, which may have a dominant effect on a person’s 
propensity to become self-employed. Studies that fail to account for this endogeneity 
overestimate the role of personal wealth, and therefore yield spurious evidence of finan-
cial market imperfections. 
The ideal solution is, of course, to find an instrument for wealth. A popular choice has 
been inheritance, lottery winnings, or capital gains on housing (Blanchflower and Oswald 
[1991]; Holtz-Eakin, Joulfaian, and Rosen [1994a, 1994b]; Hurst and Lusardi [2004]; 
Lindh and Ohlsson [1996]; Georgellis, Sessions, and Tsitsianis [2005]). The underlying 
rationale for choosing these variables as an instrument for wealth is that inheritance, lot-
tery winnings, or capital gains on housing are windfall gains, which one supposes should 
have no direct relationship with unobserved ability. One common feature of these three 
instruments is that they themselves are part of household assets, which gives rise to the 
possibility that these variables could be indirectly related to unobserved ability.  
First, consider inheritance. As we know, the size of inheritance depends on the wealth of 
parents. Furthermore, a wealthy family is also like to have other characteristics favorable 
to successful business formation, including good education, successful career experience, 
and extensive social networks. All these factors may affect a person’s entrepreneurial 
prospects. Dunn and Holtz-Eakin (2000) offer some direct evidence in their study of the 
intergenerational transmission of wealth and experience. First, they find that self-
employed parents tend to be much wealthier than wage-employed parents. They further 
show that parents’ entrepreneurial histories have a strong positive effect on a son’s entry 
into entrepreneurship. In contrast, the impact of parents’ financial capital is quite small. 
These findings suggest two separate effects that may be captured by inheritance on the 
entry of self-employment: a pure wealth effect and the effect of family-specific human 
capital, such as entrepreneurial skills, managerial human capital, or knowledge of busi-
ness.  
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Hurst and Lusardi (2004) suggest a way to test the correlation between inheritance and 
these unobserved family-specific factors. The underlying mechanism is that if inheritance 
is simply a proxy for liquidity constraints, we would only expect a significant effect on 
the probability of starting a business of inheritance received in the past. In contrast, if 
inheritance also proxies for other factors such as entrepreneurial ability, then both past 
inheritance and future inheritance should predict current business entry. Their result 
shows almost equivalent effects of these two types of inheritance on the probability of 
starting a business, which proves again that inheritance is likely an invalid instrument for 
wealth.  
Lottery winnings might appear to be less likely than inheritance to be related to any per-
sonal or family characteristics. Nonetheless, the problem with lottery winnings is that 
they are likely to be associated with low-ability or low-income people who wish to 
change the direction of their fortune wheel by buying lottery tickets. It is well-known that 
low-income and less-educated families buy lottery tickets at a much greater rate than do 
high-income educated families (see McCrary and Pavlak [2002] for a review). If income 
and education are mismeasured, then this alone would invalidate lottery winnings as an 
instrument. However, there is also evidence that lottery demand is related to characteris-
tics that are likely unobservable to the econometrician even in the best of circumstances. 
Brenner (1986), for example, reports from a Canadian survey of 93 lottery winners that 
“[t]he image of the lottery ticket buyer that emerges . . .  is of a person who, finding all 
other avenues of success closed because of one form or other of sudden adversity, turns 
to lotteries as a recourse.” 
Hurst and Lusardi (2004) use capital gains on housing as an instrument for change in 
wealth. There are reservations about using capital gains on housing for two main reasons. 
First, the size of capital gains on housing depends on the size of the house, which, again, 
is positively related to the owner’s ability. Second, the appreciation of housing price is 
usually higher in densely populated cities with expanding economic opportunities, places 
where people are more likely to be attracted to entrepreneurship because of abundant op-
portunities. To ameliorate these problems, Hurst and Lusardi (2004) obtain regional 
variations in house prices after controlling for household demographics and regional eco-
nomic activity. These unpredicted variations are then assigned to each household by re-
gion, and then used as an instrument for household wealth.  
A recent study by Nanda (2008) examines the effect of a tax reform in Denmark on entry 
into entrepreneurship. Departing from the prior research which looks into the existence of 
liquidity constraints through the relationship between wealth and entrepreneurial entry, 
Nanda (2008) exploits an exogenous change in the cost of finance to distinguish the ef-
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fect of wealth constraints on entrepreneurship from other unobservable factors that may 
affect a person’s propensity to become an entrepreneur.  
In this paper, I still follow previous studies that aim to find a suitable instrument for 
wealth, but take a new approach by using as an instrument an indicator variable recording 
whether the individual is the eldest son. This instrument is unlikely to be especially use-
ful in countries such as the United States, where there is little correlation between birth 
order and inheritance. However, I carry out this study using South Korean panel data, 
exploiting a specific trait of Korean culture. South Korea has normally been regarded as a 
male-dominant society in which fidelity to one’s parents is highly valued. Prendergast 
(2005) describes the traditional role of the eldest son in South Korea, which is extremely 
significant. In the past, the eldest son was expected to remain in the house, care for eld-
erly parents, and take responsibilities of the whole family. In return, he would receive 
most, sometimes all, of the parents’ bequest. Today, as more Koreans migrate from rural 
areas to the cities for either education or job opportunities, the traditional family tie be-
tween the son and his parents has weakened, and the traditional expectations for the eld-
est son is not as strict as before. However, the preference for the eldest son to be the pri-
mary heir remains strong among elderly South Koreans. Indeed, until 1990, it was written 
into law that the eldest son should receive an inheritance twice the amount of that re-
ceived by other sons. In 1990 this rule was abolished and replaced with provisions requir-
ing an equal share of inheritance among all siblings, regardless of sex. But this change in 
law is frequently circumvented in practice. A very common way is for parents to transfer 
much of their wealth to their sons, and especially to their eldest son, when the parents are 
still alive. This practice leads to the fundamental identifying strategy of this paper, that 
being the eldest son in Korea is positively correlated with an individual’s wealth, through 
either inheritance or pre-mortem wealth transfer from parents. As a person’s birth order is 
not, ceteris paribus, likely to be affected by unobserved family characteristics, and is not 
correlated with economic or regional factors, it is a promising candidate instrument for 
wealth.   
There are two main concerns about the usefulness of this instrument. One relates to the 
eldest son’s responsibility of taking care of elderly parents, which inevitably involves 
some substantial expenditure. Although nowadays this filial obligation tends to be shared 
by all offspring, in customary practice, it is still the eldest son or the well-off child who is 
expected to provide more financial support to the parents (see Prendergast [2005]). Thus, 
although the eldest son receives more wealth transfer from parents, his financial respon-
sibility for the parents may reduce this pecuniary benefit, perhaps to the extent that it 
fully offsets the positive wealth effect of being the eldest son.    
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The second concern is associated with educational expenses. For many Korean parents, 
paying for a child’s college education is considered as an alternative way of wealth 
transmission. Hence, in many cases, if the eldest son has a college education, parents pre-
fer to leave more wealth to his siblings who did not go to college. This behavior of par-
ents is based on two considerations. On the one hand, parents think they already paid for 
the eldest son’s college education, which often cost a large part of family wealth. Thus, 
his siblings should have most part of the remaining wealth. On the other hand, it occurs to 
parents that life should be relatively easier for children with college education. Hence, 
children without college education should receive more help from the family. 
Everything hinges on how to distinguish these two methods of wealth transfer and obtain 
a clear-cut wealth effect of being the eldest son. My strategy relies on sorting the eldest 
son into two types – with or without college education, and treating them separately. Ac-
cording to the issues discussed above, if the eldest son is college-educated, we expect him 
to receive relatively less wealth transfer from the parents, but instead provide more finan-
cial support to the parents and the family. Conversely, if the eldest son has no college 
education, he is expected to receive relatively more wealth transmitted from the parents 
while provide less financial support to the parents. Therefore, the subsequent hypothesis 
is that wealth effect is positive for the eldest sons with no college education, but negative 
for those with college education.  
I implement the IV estimation using data from the Korean Labor and Income Panel 
Study. Without controlling for the number of siblings, the estimated effect of wealth in-
strumented with the son’s birth order is positive for both the educated and uneducated 
groups of observations. But the result is not statistically significant. A plausible explana-
tion for obtaining an insignificant result is the noise of the instrument caused by the 
variations in the sibling count. In my sample, the number of siblings an individual has 
varies from 0 to 16.  This variation may give rise to two problems. First, if a family has 
too many children, the portion of wealth transferred to the children, even the eldest son, 
could be relatively small. As a result, its contribution to overall wealth is limited. Second, 
the chance of being an eldest son increases in families with fewer children. As the size of 
a family is often related to the parents’ education, the variation in family size causes a 
potential endogeneity problem. These two problems can be alleviated by either adding 
controls for the sibling count or restricting the sample to individuals with a similar num-
ber of siblings. In this paper, I adopt the second strategy, limiting the sample to individu-
als who report having 3-5 siblings. The wealth effect generated in the restricted sample is 
positive and significant, and provides support for the existence of liquidity constraints.     
The paper is organized as follows. The next section provides a brief description of the 
data construction and some summary statistics. To illustrate the key problems of the 
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analysis, section 3 presents the results from a baseline probit regression without instru-
menting. Section 4 provides the cultural background that supports the intuition of the in-
strumental variable. Section 5 reports the IV estimates along with some robustness 
checks. Section 6 concludes.     
2. Data and Descriptive Statistics 
The data used in this paper come from the Korean Labor and Income Panel Study 
(KLIPS). The KLIPS is a longitudinal survey of originally 5,000 South Korean urban 
households and their family members. The data contain information on household and 
personal demographics, as well as individuals’ employment history. Starting from 1998, 
the KLIPS has been completed up to 2005 (the 8th wave). In this study, I focus on the five 
survey years spanning from 2000 to 2004 (the 3rd Wave - the 7th Wave). This provides a 
sample of total 4,999 individuals who were either wage workers or self-employed work-
ers throughout the period. Not all individuals remained in the sample for all five years. 
The mean participation in the sample is 2.1 years, providing me with 10,522 observations 
on these individuals.  
In this section, I provide some of the descriptive summaries of the sample. A more de-
tailed description of this data set and variable construction is presented in the appendix. 
Table 1 summarizes the sample demographics by employment status, while Table 2 
summarizes the distribution of employment status by demographics. Sixty-eight percent 
is male; twenty-six percent is 35 years old or below, and 61 percent is aged between 36 
and 55; around 35 percent of the sample had college degree; and the majority of the sam-
ple was married (88 percent). The fraction married is so large because the sample con-
tains observations on household heads and their spouses if they have one—if spouses are 
excluded, the fraction married is 79 percent. 
As Table 1 shows, male, non-college educated, married, and middle-aged individuals are 
more likely to be self-employed. The column and rows labeled “TRANSITION” provide 
information on observations recording a transition from wage employment to self-
employment. Although 24.9 percent of the sample consists of self-employed individuals, 
only 0.8 percent of the observations involve a transition. This number may modestly un-
derestimate the real rate of transition, as nearly four percent of the observations reported 
being self-employed the first time they entered the sample. Some of these observations 
may correspond to a switch from wage-employment to self-employment, but I am not 
able to identify them. Nonetheless it is clear that self-employment is both common and 
stable in South Korea. One percent of male respondents made at least one switch from 
wage-employment to self-employment, 
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TABLE 1 
 Demographic Distribution by Employment Status and Transition into Self-Employment 
 
TOTAL SELF-EMPLOYED WAGE-EARNER TRANSITIONS 
Male 68 73.9 66.1 78.8 
College 35.4 26.8 38.2 38.8 
Married 87.9 90.6 87 90.6 
     
Age     
   19-35 26.4 12.9 30.9 30.6 
   36-45 35.4 35.2 35.5 29.4 
   46-55 25.4 32.6 22.9 30.6 
   >56 12.8 19.2 10.7 9.4 
Figures are percentages of each column falling into each row class. 10,522 observations. 
 
compared to only 0.5 percent among female respondents. The probability of transition is 
also slightly higher among married and college-educated people. Although the rate of 
self-employment is highest among those over age 55, the great majority of transitions into 
self-employment occur at younger ages. This is consistent with the stylized fact that older 
people are less likely to switch to self-employment.  
 
TABLE 2 
Distribution of Employment Status by Demographic Variables 
  AGE RANGE 
 TOTAL 19-35 36-45 46-55 >55 
SELF-EMPLOYED 
TRANSITION 
26.2 
  0.81 
12.2 
  0.9 
24.8 
  0.7 
32.1 
  1.0 
37.3 
  0.6 
 GENDER COLLEGE EDUCATED MARITAL STATUS 
 MALE FEMALE YES NO MARRIED SINGLE 
SELF-EMPLOYED 
TRANSITION 
27.0 
0.9 
20.4 
0.5 
18.9 
0.9 
28.2 
0.8 
25.7 
0.8 
19.3 
0.6 
Figures are percentages of each column falling into each row class. 10,522 observations. 
 
Table 3 summarizes the distribution of wage earners and the self-employed across major 
industries. Wage earners are more heavily represented in manufacturing, construction, 
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and education. The self-employed are more likely to be found in service industries, espe-
cially in retail and wholesale where over one third of the self-employed work. 
 
TABLE 3 
 Summary Statistics by Industry 
 PERCENTAGE 
 TOTAL SELF-EMPLOYED WAGE-EARNER 
Manufacturing 25.6 14.6 29.3 
Wholesale and Retail 15.7 33.2   9.9 
Construction   9.7   6.6 10.7 
Transportation and Communication   7.4   8.8   6.9 
Education   7.3   3.3   8.7 
Hotels and Restaurants   6.5 11.8   4.7 
Community, Repair, and Personal Service   5.8   8.7   4.8 
Financial Institution and Insurance   4.7   1.3   5.8 
Other 17.3 11.7 19.2 
Total Observations 10,522 2,620 7,902 
 
3. Self-Employment and Wealth Constraints: Probit Estimates 
In the previous studies of liquidity constraints, a general baseline specification for the 
estimation is 
 0 1 2 3i i i i iselfe a I Xβ β β β ε′ ′= + + + +              (1) 
where the dummy variable, selfei, indicates a transition into self-employment;  is 
household wealth; Ii and Xi are two sets of control variables.  is a vector of observed 
demographic characteristics, such as age, gender, marital status, and educational attain-
ment, while Xi is a vector of employment variables, including previous wage earnings, 
years of work experience, indicator variables of employment and occupation, etc.1 εi 
represents all other determinants of the transition into self-employment, including an in-
dividual’s unobserved entrepreneurial attributes. Before proceeding to estimate equation 
                                                     
1 Few studies actually control for all these terms. Most studies include some subset of these vari-
ables.  
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(1), assumptions about three key explanatory variables, household wealth, wages, and 
educational attainment, merit some discussion. 
3.1 Linearity in Wealth 
Equation (1) specifies a linear relationship between household wealth and the probability 
of becoming self-employed.2 Previous work also tends to report results from nonlinear 
specifications. For example, Hurst and Lusardi (2004) estimate a nonlinear wealth model 
with a fifth-order polynomial in wealth. They conclude that the nonlinear specification 
fits the data better, as a simple linear relationship is likely to be driven by households at 
the top of the wealth distribution. 
To decide which model is more appropriate for the South Korean sample, I first run sev-
eral simple regressions using both linear and non-linear specifications. The variable of 
wealth is constructed based on the formula used by Evans and Jovanovic (1989) and Xu 
(1997): Net Assets=Investment in Real Estate + Financial Assets (including Savings, 
Stocks, Bonds, Insurance, Loans to friends or relatives, and other financial assets) – 
Debts (including balance of debt from bank/non-bank, balance borrowed from private 
route, balance from loans, and other debts). All these variables are originally measured in 
units of 10 million Korean won, approximately US$10,000. Net assets are expressed in 
real value with the base year of 2000. The essential argument for using birth order as an 
instrument for wealth is the plausible relationship between being the eldest son and a per-
son’s household wealth. But this relationship may not be found in poor families, as par-
ents do not have much to give, even to the eldest son. In this case, the instrument would 
be uninformative, which is the downside of this approach. The concern is substantiated in 
the unreported first stage analysis that is carried out separately among observations with 
positive or negative household assets. In the former case, being the eldest son increases a 
person’s household assets by 9,200,000 won (around 8363 US dollars) among observa-
tions with positive household assets, and the result is significant at the one percent level. 
In contrast, among observations with negative household assets, which are also more 
likely to be associated with poor family background and low education, I find no signifi-
cant relationship between wealth and a son’s birth order. Based on the consideration of 
the relevance of the instrument, the current analysis only focuses on individuals with pos-
itive household assets. Respondents who reported negative household assets or had 
                                                     
2 Here I follow Hurst and Lusardi (2004) and refer equation (1) as the “linear” specification for 
wealth. In contrast, a model that involves the higher power of wealth is referred as a “nonlinear” 
specification for wealth.     
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missing information on assets are removed from the sample. This way also gives the con-
venience of using logarithm of wealth in the later analysis.    
Column (1) in Table 4 shows the results from the linear specification. Consistent with 
previous findings, the effect of wealth on the probability of becoming self-employed is 
positive and significant at the ten percent level. However, the marginal effect is quite 
small: for each US$100,000 increase in household assets, the probability of becoming 
self-employed increases by 0.3 percent. This number is close to the 0.5 percent reported 
by Hurst and Lusardi (2004) using the PSID data. 
 
TABLE 4 
Comparing Linear and Nonlinear Specifications for Wealth 
  
DEPT. VAR: PROB. BECOMING SELF-
EMPLOYED 
 (1) (2) 
LAGGED ASSETS/1000       0.01***    0.02** 
 (4.26) (2.97) 
(LAGGED ASSETS/1000)2 ---     -5.28e-05 
  (-1.51) 
WAGE/1000    -1.56**    -1.65** 
 (-2.65) (-2.73) 
AGE -0.01*    -0.01** 
 (-1.73) (-2.03) 
MARRIED 0.05 0.03 
 (0.32) (0.19) 
MALE    0.25**    0.26** 
 (2.37) (2.42) 
COLG 0.04 0.03 
 (0.41) (0.27) 
MARGINAL EFFECTS OF ASSETS      0.0003**      0.0005** 
 (4.03) (3.06) 
OBS. 6,355 6,355 
In this and subsequent tables, number of observations varies as a result of missing 
data on selected regressors. Significance levels: ***0.01, **0.05, *0.1. 
 
In Column (2) of Table 4, a quadratic in assets is added to the regression. The marginal 
effect of wealth on the probability of self-employment is 0.5 percent for each $100,000 
increase in household assets, which is slightly higher than the marginal effect obtained in 
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the linear model. The opposite signs of the two coefficients suggest that the effect of 
wealth on the probability of switching to self-employment declines as wealth rises, but 
the estimated coefficient on the squared term is not significant at the conventional ten 
percent level.  
Bartus (2005) has suggested that, to find out whether the nonlinear effect is increasing at 
a decreasing rate or inversely U-shaped, we can check the value of the original term that 
maximizes the linear prediction. If the value is within the range of the original term, then 
the effect is inversely U-shaped. In this model, the linear prediction-maximizing value of 
assets is 285.92, which is higher than its maximum 225.84. This implies that the marginal 
effect of assets on the odds of starting a business is positive in general, but stronger, in 
particular, for people at the lower end of wealth distribution. Unsurprisingly, a $10,000 
increase of assets means more to the poor than to the rich, given they both want to start a 
business.  
The conclusion is that although it is possible that the effect of wealth on the probability of 
becoming self-employed is not constant over the whole distribution of wealth, this nonli-
near relationship does not seem to be prominent in this Korean data set. Meanwhile, a 
likelihood ratio test also does not reject the specification in which wealth enters linearly 
(p-value .12). 
In this paper, I make a slight change of specification (1) by using logarithm of wealth, so 
the coefficient on wealth represents the overall effect of a one percent change in house-
hold assets on the probability of starting a business. Because of different currencies, it is 
more convenient to focus on the effect of percentage change for the purpose of compar-
ing the results with those obtained in the US data.    
3.2 Wage Earnings 
Prior self-employment earnings in the wage-employment sector are usually considered as 
an important determinant of self-employment. Table 4 shows a negative relationship be-
tween previous wage earnings and entry into self-employment, which supports the com-
mon notion that people with lower earnings are more likely to choose self-employment 
because of lower opportunity costs (Georgellis, Sessions, and Tsitsianis [2005]).  
Of course, interpretation of the wage effect is complicated by its correlation with unob-
served ability. Several studies have shown that self-employment is made up of workers 
with the lowest or highest ability (Ohyama [2007], Åstebro, Chen, and Thompson 
[2008]). The former are pushed into self-employment because their poor performance 
limits their job opportunities in the wage sector, while the latter are attracted to self-
employment by its higher returns. In this sense, if wage is positively related to workers’ 
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ability, we would expect to see both high-wage and low-wage workers switching from 
wage sector to self-employment. Which group accounts for the larger proportion depends 
on the specific sample. Furthermore, if ability is also considered as being transferable 
across sectors, low-wage workers would be less likely to become self-employed since 
they cannot expect to do better in self-employment.         
To partly address this endogeneity issue, I replace the level of wage with its growth rate 
in the model for two reasons. First, workers care about the prospect of their income more 
than their current earnings. Anticipating a further decrease of their wage income in the 
future is more likely to make them consider self-employment. More important, the nega-
tive growth of wage can often be attributed to an exogenous shock instead of a worker’s 
own ability. Thus, workers who are experiencing decreasing earnings could expect to 
earn more in self-employment. Thus, I expect a negative relationship between the growth 
of wage and the probability of entry into self-employment. Using the growth rate of wage 
growth is certainly not a perfect way to solve the endogeneity problem. But it alleviates 
the severity of this issue.    
3.4 Education 
The trouble with educational attainment is that it is closely related to several other co-
variates, such as earnings and occupation (Georgellis, Sessions, and Tsitsianis [2005]). 
After controlling for these variables, previous longitudinal studies show no significant 
effect of formal education on the probability of becoming self-employed.   
Educational attainment is also correlated with wealth. This correlation arises in two ways. 
In the first, highly-educated people are better at accumulating wealth. In the second, even 
at the same level of wealth, highly-educated people may have easier access to external 
finance because of better credibility, networks, or perceptions of potential financiers 
about the chances for success. Thus, there is a possibility that highly-educated would-be 
entrepreneurs face fewer liquidity constraints compared to their less-educated counter-
parts. This difference, however, is neglected if education is added to the regression as a 
control variable, in which case the slope on wealth is forced to be the same for both edu-
cated and uneducated groups. The issue becomes even clearer in the present Korean data. 
As mentioned from the outset, the relationship between wealth and being the eldest son in 
Korea is likely to be negative if the son had a college education and positive if he did not. 
Although it is so far a hypothetical argument, I will show later the evidence in the data 
that supports this hypothesis. To distinguish these two cases, I drop the variable of educa-
tion from all regression models in the following analysis. Instead, I split the sample into 
two sub-samples: one of observations with college education and the other without. Each 
regression is then estimated separately on each sub-sample.     
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3.4 A Modified Baseline Specification 
My modified baseline specification is   
 0 1 2 3ln( )i i i i iselfe a pgw Xβ β β β ε′= + + + + ,            (2) 
where selfei is still a binary variable that takes the value one if individual i switches from 
wage-employment to self-employment, and zero if otherwise; ln(ai) is the logarithm of 
net assets in the previous year; pgwi is the growth rate of monthly wage in the previous 
year for individual i; and Xi is a vector of demographic variables including age, gender, 
and marital status. At this stage, I do not control for occupation and industry. This ex-
periment is left to the robustness check at the end of the analysis. 
Table 5 reports the estimated effect of net assets on the probability of becoming self-
employed in the modified baseline probit regression, (2).  
 
TABLE 5 
 Probability of Becoming Self-Employed: Probit Regressions 
  
DEPT. VAR=1 IF SWITCHED INTO SELF-
EMPLOYMENT IN CURRENT YEAR. 
  
(1) 
NO COLLEGE 
(2) 
COLLEGE 
LAGGED LOG ASSETS 0.09* 0.01 
 (1.76) (0.25) 
GROWTH OF MONTHLY WAGE IN 
PREVIOUS YEAR -0.04 -0.45 
 (-0.26) (-1.49) 
AGE -0.01 -0.01 
 (-0.78) (-0.80) 
MARRIED -0.32 --- 
 (-1.55)  
MALE 0.07 0.19 
 (0.43) (0.76) 
AV. LOG LIKELIHOOD -0.06 -0.08 
PSEUDO R2 0.02 0.02 
OBS. 2,605 1,387 
 Z-scores are in parentheses. Significance levels: ***0.01, **0.05, *0.10.  Variable MARRIED is 
dropped from the regression in column (2) because MARRIED=0 predicts self-employment per-
fectly. 
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Column (1) shows that in the non college-educated sample, there is a positive relationship 
between the odds of becoming self-employed and the amount of assets prior to the transi-
tion into self-employment. The coefficient on the variable of interest, lagged log assets, 
indicates that a ten percent increase in assets raises the probability of becoming self-
employed by two percent. The result is significant at ten percent level. In column (2), the 
college-educated sample, the estimated coefficient on lagged log assets is positive, but it 
is much smaller and not significantly different from zero. Thus, the effect of assets ap-
pears to be stronger for the non college-educated people than their college-educated 
counterpart. The estimated results on other covariates suggest that men are more likely to 
switch from wage employment to self-employment; while people who are married or old-
er are less likely to make this transition. Moreover, people are more likely to become 
self-employed when they experience declining earnings in the wage-employment sector. 
While the signs are consistent with intuition, none of these effects is statistically signifi-
cant. 
The main concern with these regressions is of course the expected positive correlation 
between assets and unobserved entrepreneurial ability. It is worth noting that this unob-
served ability is not equivalent to formal education, and it is entirely possible that people 
with the same level of education differ in unobserved abilities. I turn now to IV estima-
tions, using birth order as an instrument. The next section begins with a justification for 
using this instrument in Korean data. 
 
4. The Hypothesis and Cultural Background 
We don’t have much to give, but the house will go to our eldest son. This is for two 
reasons. First our house was bought with some help from him. He deserves a share be-
cause of this. Second, my eldest son went through many difficult times looking after his 
younger brothers and sisters. We wanted them to go to school in Chonju so my first son 
and his wife took them into his house and cared for them there.  
Prendergast (2005: 160) 
This conversation comes from an interview of a Korean woman, who was asked about 
her plans for dividing the family’s house and property. Her reply characterizes the basic 
role that the Korean society has defined for the son, especially the eldest son. In the old 
days, the social expectation was that the eldest son should remain within the family, even 
after married, and take care of parents in their old age. The eldest son should also take 
responsibility for helping the family’s welfare and supporting younger siblings. In return, 
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the eldest son would receive the lion’s share of any inheritance. According to pre-1962 
legal code, the amount of inheritance the eldest son should receive was twice the amount 
received by other younger sons. Sorensen (1986) and Prendergast (2005) report that it 
was customary for the eldest son to receive at least half the estate regardless of the num-
ber of other sons. Married daughters were usually excluded from the division altogether. 
This traditional inheritance system has been notionally weakened since legal changes in 
1990 stipulating that all successors have equal shares of an inheritance regardless of sex 
or marital status. However, Sorensen (1986) and Yang (1998) note that the influence of 
patriarchal rules and obligations for sons continues through either traditions in Family 
Law or belief in the “moral value of filial piety”. In Prendergast’s (2005) survey of fifty 
elderly men in southwest Korea, almost half of the respondents preferred the eldest son to 
receive the largest share of inheritance. Prendergast (2005) also found that elderly people 
find a number of ways to avoid strictly following the equal inheritance rule. One of the 
avenues is through article 1008-2 of the Civil Code, which states that if a person has 
made a special contribution to family property, this contributory portion should be con-
sidered as his inherited portion and should be added to the amount he is supposed to in-
herit from the rest of the property. Because this clause tends to compensate those (often 
sons), who remain with parents and provide them with financial support, parents have 
considerable latitude to pass more property to their sons. Another common way to cir-
cumvent the law is through a family meeting, in which the parents declare their wishes to 
transmit property to specific recipients (such as the eldest son) before all family mem-
bers. But the most important way to circumvent the inheritance law is to transmit prop-
erty prior to death. In fact, because of this practice, many Korean parents also count dow-
ries and other wedding expenses, investments in education, or donations for setting up 
businesses, as part of their pre-mortem transfer of property. In practice, this has provided 
justification for providing daughters little of the inheritance. At the end of his field study, 
Prendergast (2005) concludes that in modern Korea sons, especially eldest sons, remain 
highly favored in parents’ decisions about the distribution of family wealth. 
As the distribution of family wealth can be either prior to death or through bequests, it 
seems that being the eldest son in South Korea should be positively related to a person’s 
wealth. However, this relationship may be rather complicated when parents are still alive. 
As mentioned above, the eldest son has the obligation of caring for elderly parents and 
for providing support to other siblings. Married daughters are also expected to contribute 
to their natal family, but the amounts and frequencies of money provided by them are 
typically far less than those provided by their brothers. From this perspective, the eldest 
son has the greatest financial burden of caring parents and siblings, though he is ulti-
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mately rewarded more as well. As a result, the net effect of being an eldest son on wealth 
becomes a purely empirical question.  
Because education frequently is counted as part of the pre-mortem transfer made to chil-
dren, I conjecture that net financial transfers from the eldest son to his parents while they 
are alive are greater for the college educated. Table 6 presents summary statistics of net 
financial transfers made by eldest sons to living parents. During each wave’s interview, 
respondents were asked about financial support they gave or received from parents in the 
previous year. The net transfer is the difference between the amount that is provided to 
their parents and the amount received from them. The numbers do not include real estate 
transfers or post-mortem inheritances. The mean net transfer among the college-educated 
sub-sample is, as conjectured, more than twice the mean among the non college-educated 
sub-sample. Moreover, the net amount provided by the eldest sons with college education 
is markedly higher at the 50th, 75th, and 95th percentiles.  
 
TABLE 6 
Net Wealth Transfer to Parents by the Eldest Sons (unit: 10,000 won) 
 Non-College Educated College Educated 
MEAN  40.0  96.0 
STD. DEV 181.7 829. 7 
25TH PERCENTILE    0    0 
50TH PERCENTILE    0    0 
75TH PERCENTILE  10   80 
95TH PERCENTILE 300 440 
OBS. 1,097 966 
 
Table 7 reports the results from regressing the net transfer on a series of demographic 
variables. Being the eldest son is positively related to net wealth transfer, indicating that 
the eldest son, in general, provides more financial support to parents than other siblings. 
This relationship is even stronger for the eldest sons who had college education, as shown 
in columns (2) and (3). Thus, the results are consistent with the conjecture that the effect 
of being the eldest son on wealth may differ between these two educational levels. 
To summarize, although the eldest sons often dominate the “wealth transmission” system, 
they are also the main provider of the aged parents’ income. This burden is even larger if 
the eldest son is wealthier or better educated, in which case his share of wealth transfer 
from parents might also be largely reduced. Hence, the hypothesis is that the relationship 
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between wealth and being the eldest son in South Korea is negative if the son is college 
educated, and positive if he is not. 
 
TABLE 7 
The Effect of Being the Eldest Son on Wealth Transfer 
 DEPT. VAR: NET INCOME TRANSFER TO PARENTS 
 ALL INDIVIDUALS NON-COLLEGE EDUCATED COLLEGE EDUCATED 
MALE  -34.77** -7.49 -70.97* 
 (-2.13) (-0.87) (-1.70) 
AGE 0.44 -0.07 -0.32 
 (0.65) (-0.21) (-0.17) 
MARRIED -1.44 -3.97 7.74 
 (-0.07) (-0.39) (0.14) 
ELDEST 39.92*** 20.25*** 74.93** 
 (2.67) (2.46) (2.09) 
NO. OF SIBLINGS 5.79* 1.61 13.63 
 (1.61) (0.87) (1.41) 
LAGGED LOG WAGE 54.64*** 24.62*** 108.58*** 
 (4.89) (4.15) (3.54) 
COLG 23.2* --- --- 
 (1.66)   
OBS. 4,852 2,995 1,857 
t-statistics are in parentheses. Significance levels: ***0.01, **0.05, *0.10.   
 
5. Self-Employment and Wealth Constraints: IV Results 
In the 6th wave of the KLIPS, respondents were asked the following two questions:   
• Do you have either brothers or sisters? a. Number of total brothers, b. Number 
of total sisters, c. Birth order. 
• Do you have older brothers or sisters? a. Number of older brothers, b. Number 
of older sisters. 
Based on respondents’ answers, a male respondent can be defined as the eldest son if he 
does not have any older brothers. A binary variable, eldest, is then created, which equals 
one if a male respondent is the eldest son in the family, and zero if otherwise. Eldest sons 
account for thirty percent of total observations and 43 percent of observations on males. 
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Table 8 provides the distribution of the number of siblings of eldest sons, which varies 
from zero to sixteen. Five percent of eldest sons have only one sibling, 73 percent have 
two to five siblings, and 22 percent have more than five siblings.  
 
TABLE 8 
 Distribution of Number of Siblings of Eldest Sons 
NO. OF SIBLINGS PERCENT 
NO. OF 
SIBLINGS PERCENT 
0 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
0 
5.2 
13.1 
20.6 
22.5 
17.0 
10.6 
5.8 
4.1 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
0.8 
0.2 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0.2 
Distribution based on 3,200 observations.  
 
5.1 Instrument Validity and Relevance 
The variable, eldest, is not a valid instrument if it is correlated with the disturbances in 
the baseline regression (2). This can happen if the variable turns out to be an omitted va-
riable from equation (2), or it is correlated with some omitted variables, even if it itself is 
not part of the baseline regression. The test of eldest being an omitted variable is done by 
re-estimating equation (2) with eldest included as an additional explanatory variable. 
Columns (1) and (2) of Table 9 display the results. For both sub-samples, the estimated 
coefficients on eldest are not significantly different from zero, which relieves this con-
cern.  
The main advantage of using birth order as the instrument for wealth is its little correla-
tion with any family or social factors. Nonetheless, one may argue that the chance of be-
ing the eldest son decreases with the number of siblings, while family size is commonly 
considered as a reflection of parents’ education and household wealth. Then the question 
is whether or not would the size of siblings change the validity of this instrument and fur-
ther affect the estimated result. Columns (3) and (4) of Table 9 show that the estimated 
coefficient on the variable of sibling number is not statistically significant, indicating that 
sibling size is not an omitted variable. This result excludes the possibility that the instru-
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ment is correlated with a relevant variable omitted from the regression. Even so, the re-
maining concern is the implicit correlation between sibling size and unobserved ability, 
which may subsequently affect the validity of the instrument, eldest. This problem can be 
resolved by restricting the sample according to a certain sibling size, which is addressed 
in the later part of the analysis. 
 
TABLE 9  
Testing for Omitted Variables 
 DEP. VAR: = 1IF BECOMING SELF-EMPLOYED IN CURRENT YEAR 
 (1) 
NO COLLEGE 
(2) 
COLLEGE 
(3) 
NO COLLEGE 
(4) 
COLLEGE 
   0.13** 0.03    0.13** 0.04 LAGGED LOG ASSETS 
(2.11) (0.42) (2.19) (0.65) 
-0.02 -0.08 ___ ___ ELDEST SON=1 (-0.08) (-0.42)   
___ ___ -0.05 -0.10 NO. OF SIBLINGS   (-1.11) (-1.54) 
-0.23 -0.55 -0.22 -0.55 WAGE GROWTH IN 
PREVIOUS YEAR (-0.93) (-1.58) (-0.91) (-1.58) 
0.002 -0.01 0.00 0.00 AGE (-0.18) (-0.67) (0.03) (-0.22) 
   -0.48** --- -0.48** --- MARRIED (-2.20)  (-2.20)  
0.01 0.58 0.00 0.53 MALE (0.04) (1.56) (0.00) (1.48) 
AV. LOG LIKELIHOOD -0.06 -0.08 -0.06 -0.08 
PSEUDO R2 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.05 
OBS. 2,017 1,155 2,017 1,155 
Z-scores are in parentheses. Significance levels: ***0.01, **0.05, *0.10.   
 
Murray (2006) suggests the use of reduced-form regressions to check the intuition of the 
instrumental variable. Table 10 reports results from estimating the reduced-form regres-
sion in which the dependent variable is the probability of switching to self-employment, 
selfe, and the independent variables include the instrument, eldest, as well as all non-
troublesome explanatory variables in the modified baseline equation (2). The estimated 
coefficient on eldest is statistically insignificant in both college-educated and non col-
lege-educated sub-samples. According to Angrist and Krueger (2001), there are three 
possible implications based on this result: either the model is under-identified, or IV es-
timation is uninformative, or the troublesome variable, lagged log assets, does not matter 
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for the likelihood of becoming self-employed (i.e., there are no liquidity constraints). Un-
der-identification should not be the case under the assumption that demographic variables 
(such as age, gender, and marital status) are not contemporarily correlated with the error 
term; the purpose of using the growth of monthly wage is also to avoid the endogeneity 
problem presented by wage levels. The question then pins down to whether or not the 
instrument, eldest, is relevant to wealth. If not, the instrument can not properly serve the 
purpose of the analysis and IV estimation is uninformative; otherwise, the results in Table 
10 offer a sign of no liquidity constraints.  
  
TABLE 10  
Reduced-Form Probit  Regressions 
  
DEP. VAR: = 1IF BECOMING SELF-EMPLOYED 
IN CURRENT YEAR 
  
(1) 
NO  COLLEGE 
(2) 
COLLEGE 
ELDEST 0.00 -0.09 
 (-0.01) (-0.46) 
WAGE GROWTH IN PREVIOUS YEAR -0.25 -0.54 
 (-0.99) (-1.56) 
AGE 0.00 -0.01 
 (-0.01) (-0.55) 
MARRIED -0.37 --- 
 (-1.74)  
MALE 0.01 0.57 
  (0.03) (1.54) 
OBS. 2,017 1,155 
Z-scores are in parenthesis. 
 
To examine the relevance of the instrument, eldest, I report in Table 11 the first stage 
regression estimates. It is not surprising to see in all three columns that household wealth 
is positively related to wage growth, age, and marriage. Column (1) shows no significant 
effect on wealth of the instrument, eldest, when controlling for college education. How-
ever, when splitting the sample by college education, I find opposite relationships be-
tween wealth and being the eldest son in the two sub-samples. In the non college-
educated group (column (2)), being the eldest son increases the household assets by 14 
percent. By contrast, in the college-educated group (column (3)), being the eldest son 
reduces the household assets by 19 percent. Both results are significant at around the five 
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percent level. Thus, I am confident that the variable, eldest, is an informative instrument 
for wealth. Also, the results again substantiate the previous hypothesis that the effect of 
being the eldest son on wealth differs between the college-educated group and the non 
college-educated group. This provides a foundation for the strategy of carrying out the 
analysis separately in these two groups.   
 
TABLE 11 
Testing for Relevant Instrument: OLS Regressions 
 DEPT. VAR: LOG LAGGED ASSETS 
  
(1) 
ALL 
(2) 
NO COLLEGE 
(3) 
COLLEGE 
ELDEST -0.01 0.14* -0.19** 
 (-0.18) (1.86) (-2.14) 
WAGE GROWTH IN PREVIOUS 
YEAR 0.12** 0.10** 0.19** 
 (2.85) (2.08) (2.25) 
AGE 0.03*** 0.01*** 0.07*** 
 (11.29) (3.67) (14.40) 
MARRIED 0.80*** 0.83*** 0.63*** 
 (9.16) (7.84) (4.11) 
MALE -0.06 -0.04 -0.23** 
 (-0.88) (-0.51) (-2.16) 
COLG 0.69*** --- --- 
 (12.78)   
ADJUSTED R2 0.10 0.04 0.17 
OBS. 3,267 2,017 1,250 
t-statistics are in parenthesis. Significance levels: ***0.01, **0.05, *0.10.   
 
It is worth mentioning that there are very few observations in the data that report living 
with parents. Recall from the overview of Korean culture, the distribution of property is 
strongly associated with the responsibility of caring elderly parents. In other words, a 
child other than the eldest son can receive a significant amount of bequest for living with 
and taking care of parents. In this case, living with parents would be an important ex-
planatory variable that should be included in the regression. But this would not be case in 
the present data set, for there are at most 0.5 percent of respondents who reported living 
with parents during each wave of the interview.  
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5.2 IV Estimates 
After establishing the validity and relevance of the instrument, eldest, we are finally 
ready to look at the results from the IV estimations. Table 12 reports the results of IV 
Probit regressions. Columns (1) and (2) show that the estimated coefficients on wealth—
instrumented with the variable of being the eldest son—are positive in both the college-
educated and the non college-educated sub-samples, but the estimates are not statistically 
significant.  
Wage earning is the only employment-related variable that has been controlled for in all 
the regressions so far. But wealth effects may also vary across occupations: First, entry 
into self-employment in certain fields (such as lawyer, doctor, and salesperson) likely 
requires less capital; second, a person’s previous occupation is also, to some extent, 
 
TABLE 12 
IV Probit Regressions 
  
DEP. VAR: = 1IF BECOMING SELF-EMPLOYED IN CURRENT 
YEAR 
  
(1) 
NO  COLLEGE 
(2) 
COLLEGE 
LAGGED LOG ASSETS 0.02 0.40 
 (0.01) (0.63) 
WAGE GROWTH IN PREVIOUS 
YEAR -0.21 -0.54 
 (-0.67) (-1.53) 
AGE 0.00 -0.03 
 (-0.01) (-0.81) 
MARRIED -0.39 3.32 
 (-0.30) (0.00) 
MALE 0.003 0.58* 
 (0.02) (1.77) 
AV. LOG LIKELIHOOD -1.85 -1.82 
OBS. 2,017 1,250 
Z-scores are in parenthesis. 
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TABLE 13  
IV Probit Regressions (Controlling for Previous Occupations) 
 
DEP. VAR: = 1IF BECOMING SELF-EMPLOYED IN 
CURRENT YEAR 
 (1) (2) 
 NO COLLEGE COLLEGE 
LAGGED LOG ASSETS -0.25 0.41 
 (-0.23) (0.57) 
-0.17 -0.53 WAGE GROWTH IN PREVIOUS YEAR 
 (-0.46) (-1.38) 
AGE 0.01 -0.04 
 (0.38) (-1.07) 
MARRIED -0.19 3.18 
 (-0.15) (0.00) 
MALE -0.03 0.61 
 (-0.13) (1.71) 
AV. LOG LIKELIHOOD -1.83 -1.81 
 FIRST STAGE ESTIMATES 
  NO COLLEGE COLLEGE 
ELDEST 0.13* -0.16* 
 (1.74) (-1.83) 
0.10** 0.18** WAGE GROWTH IN PREVIOUS YEAR 
 (2.07) (2.20) 
AGE 0.02*** 0.06*** 
 (4.18) (13.12) 
MARRIED 0.80*** 0.60*** 
 (7.60) (3.91) 
MALE 0.03 -0.26** 
 (0.31) (-2.23) 
OBS. 2,017 1,250 
Z-scores are in parenthesis for IV estimation, and t-statistics are in parenthesis for first stage 
estimation. Significance levels: ***0.01, **0.05, *0.10.   
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related to the type of business he would start, which in turn determines different require-
ment for initial capital. Based on this consideration, I report in Table 13 the results from 
the IV estimation after adding controls for individuals’ previous occupations. The corre-
lation between household net wealth and the instrument, eldest, remains strong in the 
first-stage regression. As shown before, this correlation is positive in the non college-
educated sub-sample and negative in the college-educated sub-sample. The IV estima-
tion, again, shows no significant wealth effect on the probability of becoming self-
employed. 
Before drawing the conclusion that there are no liquidity constraints in South Korea, we 
should return to the issue of sibling counts. As discussed before, the probability of being 
the eldest son increases if the person has fewer siblings. As the number of children is 
commonly believed to be negatively related to parents’ education, eldest is possibly cor-
related with unobserved ability through this avenue. Furthermore, if a family has too 
many children, we would expect the wealth inherited by, or transferred to, each child 
(even the eldest son) to be too small to have a significant effect on the child’s own assets. 
From this perspective, having a large size of sibling may weaken the explanatory power 
of the instrument.      
Although the number of siblings ranges between zero and sixteen, fifty-seven percent of 
the sample report having three to five. To maintain the validity of the instrument, my ini-
tial strategy is to restrict the sample to the 6,220 observations with three to five siblings 
and leave out those with too few or too many siblings. But there arises another problem 
that is noteworthy. Recall when the data set was constructed, both household heads and 
their spouses are included in the sample. The couple shares observations on household 
assets (from household data), but each partner has his or her own observations on work 
status and number of siblings. The instrument, eldest, is one if a male respondent was the 
eldest son; it is zero if a person was not the eldest son, which includes the case of being a 
female respondent. Imagine there is a female respondent whose husband was the eldest 
son. Since the husband and the wife share the same household assets, the effect of being 
the wife of the eldest son should be identical to the effect of being the eldest son on 
household assets. However, because the variable, eldest, is coded as zero for the wife, I 
am not able to capture the effect on assets of being the wife of the eldest son. In fact, 
there are 408 households of this kind in the 6th wave data set, where the variable eldest 
was initially constructed. 
The easiest solution to this problem is to restrict the sample to males. A more sophisti-
cated way is to identify each woman in the data whose husband was the eldest son, and 
then recode the variable, eldest, as one on these observations. The latter strategy allows 
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me to include more valuable observations in the regressions. I report results from both 
strategies here.   
5.3 Estimation from Males Alone    
Table 14 presents the result from restricting the sample to the male who had three to five 
siblings. First-stage estimates show that restricting the sample by sibling size increases 
the effect on wealth of being the eldest in the uneducated sub-sample. In the new re-
stricted sample, being the eldest son increases household assets by 28 percent, compared 
to 14 percent in the unrestricted sample. The result is significant at the one percent level. 
In the restricted educated sub-sample, the result shows that being the eldest son reduces 
household assets by 20 percent, which is similar to the 19 percent negative effect found in 
the unrestricted sample. More important, IV estimation yields strong evidence of liquidity 
constraints. In both sub-samples, a one percent increase in household assets increases the 
chance of becoming self-employed by about 65 percent for both groups. 
It is worth noting that for the college-educated group the baseline probit regression pre-
dicts no significant correlation between wealth and the probability of becoming self-
employed, but the IV estimation shows a positive and significant effect of wealth on self-
employment. This disparity arises for two possible reasons. The first possibility is that 
among people with college degree, the low-ability ones are more likely to become self-
employed. As wealth is positively related to unobserved ability, we cannot see any posi-
tive relationship between wealth and the odds of becoming self-employed without con-
trolling for unobserved ability in the measure of wealth. This may not be a general case, 
but in the current Korean data set, nearly half of the observations on college-educated 
business owners were engaged in wholesale and retail business or manufacturing sector. 
This business distribution is very similar to that observed among non college-educated 
self-employers. Normally, we would expect a sharp difference in the fields where these 
two groups started their businesses, considering their distinct skill sets.  
The second possibility, as suggested in Nanda (2008), is that individuals who are wealthy 
but have no college education represent the majority of self-employed workers in the 
data. If this is the case, a positive and significant relationship between wealth and self-
employment entry may not be found in the baseline regression for the college-educated 
group. However, this explanation does not seem to be plausible in the present data. A 
comparative analysis (in results not shown here) suggest that, among people who 
switched to self-employment, pre-entry assets of college-educated workers are on aver-
age three times larger than those of workers without college degree. After adjusting for 
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TABLE 14 
IV Probit Estimations in the Sample with Restricted Sibling Size (Male Only) 
 
DEP. VAR: = 1IF BECOMING SELF-EMPLOYED IN CURRENT 
YEAR 
 (1) (2) 
 NO COLLEGE COLLEGE 
LAGGED LOG ASSETS 0.63** 0.64*** 
 (2.13) (3.80) 
-0.60 -0.38 WAGE GROWTH IN PREVIOUS 
YEAR 
 (-1.17) (-1.31) 
AGE -0.03** -0.03** 
 (-2.26) (-2.21) 
MARRIED -0.52 1.45 
 (-1.36) (0.00) 
AV. LOG LIKELIHOOD -1.8 -1.78 
 FIRST STAGE ESTIMATES 
  NO COLLEGE COLLEGE 
ELDEST 0.28*** -0.20* 
 (2.85) (-1.89) 
0.09 0.15 WAGE GROWTH IN PREVIOUS 
YEAR 
 (1.39) (1.24) 
AGE 0.03*** 0.06*** 
 (6.23) (8.56) 
MARRIED 0.69*** 0.64*** 
 (4.06) (2.84) 
 BASELINE PROBIT REGRESSIONS 
 (1) (2) 
 NO COLLEGE COLLEGE 
LAGGED LOG ASSETS 0.20* -0.07 
 (1.85) (-0.84) 
AV. LOG LIKELIHOOD -0.05 -0.1 
OBS. 864 563 
Z-scores are in parenthesis for IV and baseline estimations, and t-statistics are in parenthesis for the 
first stage estimation. Significance levels: ***0.01, **0.05, *0.10.   
 
 26
the percentage of each group among all the transitions, I still find that college-educated 
self-employers were two times wealthier than the non college-educated prior to the transi-
tion. 
5.6 Estimation Including Wives of Eldest Sons 
Table 15 reports the results from the second strategy. The sample consists of all male re-
spondents who had three to five siblings, as well as their spouses if there are observa-
tions. The first-stage regressions consistently show the same positive (negative) correla-
tion between wealth and being the eldest son in the non college-educated (college-
educated) subsample. IV estimations indicate that liquidity constraints exist in both sub-
samples. All the results are highly significant at the one percent level. 
6. Conclusions 
If a person considers starting a business but has little access to external loans, he has to 
rely on his own assets at least to meet the initial requirement on capital. The wealthier he 
is, the more likely he would become self-employed. Thus, a positive effect of household 
assets on the probability of self-employment entry can serve as evidence of liquidity con-
straints in entrepreneurship. The idea is straightforward, but the analysis becomes com-
plicated due to the endogeneity problem caused by the correlation between wealth and 
unobserved ability. Moreover, finding an instrument for wealth that is unrelated to any 
factor that might stimulate entrepreneurship is also a challenge. This paper proposes an 
instrument different from those used in previous literature, a son’s birth order, to test the 
existence of liquidity constraints faced by entrepreneurs in South Korea. 
Two prominent features of Korea culture, male-dominance and fidelity, determine a 
strong relationship between birth order and wealth. Eldest sons are more likely to receive 
larger wealth transferred from parents either through bequests or pre-mortem in-kind 
transfers. Pre-mortem, they are also supposed to provide more financial support to par-
ents than are other siblings. Hence, the net effect of being the eldest son on his household 
wealth is ambiguous. The data show a positive effect for the eldest sons without college 
education, and a negative effect for those with college education. A likely explanation is 
that if the eldest son is college educated, he is less likely to receive a large wealth transfer 
from his parents as they already paid for his college education. In the meantime, he is 
more likely to be better situated so that he is able to provide his family with more finan-
cial support.  
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TABLE 15 
 Probit  IV Estimation in the Sample with Restricted Sibling Size (Both Male and Female) 
 
DEP. VAR: = 1IF BECOMING SELF-EMPLOYED IN 
CURRENT YEAR 
 (1) (2) 
 NO COLLEGE COLLEGE 
LAGGED LOG ASSETS 0.72*** 0.65*** 
 (4.96) (4.69) 
-0.48 -0.39 WAGE GROWTH IN PREVIOUS YEAR 
 (-1.19) (-1.52) 
AGE -0.03*** -0.04*** 
 (-2.89) (-3.23) 
MARRIED -0.60** 1.43 
 (-2.08) (0.00) 
MALE 0.24 0.41** 
 (0.88) (1.93) 
AV. LOG LIKELIHOOD -1.77 -1.77 
 FIRST STAGE ESTIMATES 
  NO COLLEGE COLLEGE 
ELDEST 0.24*** -0.24*** 
 (2.77) (-2.39) 
0.09 0.18 WAGE GROWTH IN PREVIOUS YEAR 
 (1.58) (1.51) 
AGE 0.03*** 0.07*** 
 (6.60) (10.05) 
MARRIED 0.70*** 0.60*** 
 (4.22) (2.70) 
MALE -0.07 -0.42*** 
 (-0.65) (-3.00) 
 BASELINE PROBIT REGRESSIONS 
 NO COLLEGE COLLEGE 
LAGGED LOG ASSETS 0.23** -0.06 
 (2.22) (-0.74) 
AV. LOG LIKELIHOOD -0.05 -0.09 
OBS. 1,062 673 
Z-scores are in parenthesis for IV and baseline estimations, and t-statistics are in parenthesis for the 
first stage estimation. Significance levels: ***0.01, **0.05, *0.10.   
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The advantage of this instrument is that it is unlikely to be correlated with any family-
specific variables, except that the probability of being the eldest is higher in a family with 
fewer children. Without controlling for sibling size in the IV estimation, I do not find any 
significant wealth effect on the probability of becoming self-employed. After restricting 
the sample to observations with three to five siblings, I find significantly positive wealth 
effect on self-employment entry in both college-educated and non college-educated sub 
samples. Thus, the IV results provide strong evidence on liquidity constraints. 
It is reasonable to question whether the eldest sons generally possess some special char-
acteristics as they grew up under different expectations. For example, parents may inten-
tionally make more investment in the eldest son’s education, expect him to be more re-
sponsible, or develop his ambition for achievement. Thus, it is possible that being the 
eldest is correlated with some personal-specific traits. However, the plausibility of this 
hypothesis needs further exploration. Moreover, whether these characteristics really have 
any influence on entry into self-employment is also uncertain. The evidence on the im-
pact of the degree of risk-aversion, for instance, is still ambiguous in the literature. Most 
importantly, we know from the present results that being the eldest son per se has no im-
pact on the probability of becoming self-employed. Future research can further explore 
the relationship between eldest sons’ characteristics and self-employment, but this is not 
in the scope of the present paper.    
Appendix: The KLIPS Sample and Variable Construction 
The Korean Labor and Income Panel Study (KLIPS) was first conducted in 1998 (Wave 
1) as a panel survey of original 5,000 Korean urban household and their family members. 
It has been completed up to 2005 (Wave 8). There are two types of data in the KLIPS: 
household data and individual data. Household data set is compiled from household ques-
tionnaire, which contains questions on household demographics, income and consump-
tion, as well as financial status. Individual data set is constructed based on individual 
questionnaire, which mainly focuses on individuals’ economic activity, employment 
characteristics, and labor market mobility.  
Based on this structure of the KLIPS, I construct one subset of personal data and the oth-
er subset of household data for each interview year from 2000 – 2004. 
Personal Variables       
The subset of personal data contains ten primary demographic and employment variables 
from the KLIPS: age, gender, marital status, college education, relationship to household 
head, employment status, main industry (previous and current), main occupation (previ-
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ous and current), hourly wage, and monthly average wage. Both types of wage are meas-
ured in terms of 10,000 Korean won (KRW). 3 In wave 6, the personal questionnaire adds 
additional questions on respondents’ siblings. Based on respondents’ answers, I create a 
dummy variable, eldest, in the subset of the 6th wave personal data. The variable equals 1 
if a person is the eldest son and 0 otherwise. 
Individuals included in each data set are either household heads or their spouses. Indi-
viduals who did not have information on hourly income or reported negative hourly in-
come are removed from each data set to limit measurement error. All five sub samples 
are restricted to individuals who were either working as wage earners or self-employed at 
the time of interview. Moreover, people who were engaged in agriculture, forestry, fish-
ery, or military were excluded from all five sub samples. 
Household Variables 
The subset of household data includes information on household wealth and parents of 
household heads or spouses. For each subset, twelve variables are constructed, which fall 
into three categories: net household assets, parents alive or not, living with parents or not 
(Heads or Spouses), and financial supports from / to parents if living apart (Heads or 
Spouses).4 
Following Evans and Jovanovic (1989) and Xu (1997), the formula used to calculate 
wealth in each subset is: Net Assets=Investment in Real Estate + Financial Assets (in-
cluding Savings, Stocks, Bonds, Insurance, Loans to friends or relatives, and other finan-
cial assets) – Debts (including balance of debt from bank/non-bank, balance borrowed 
from private route, balance from loans, and other debts). Respondents who reported nega-
tive or missing net household assets are dropped from the sample for reasons discussed in 
section 3.1. 
The combination of household and personal data sets 
For each interview year, the subsets of personal and household data are joined together 
using the household-specific identification number assigned to household in each wave 
(hhid**). The five joint subsets (five waves of interview) are then merged using the 
unique personal identification number (pid).  
                                                     
3 From 2000 to 2004, the exchange rate between won and dollars was about 1 dollar=1100 won. 
4 For waves 4-7, five variables are generated to record whether household heads and their spouses live apart 
from parents and the financial exchange between them and parents. 
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In the merged dataset, lagged values of log income, log net assets, industry, and occupa-
tion are generated. The key variable, selfe, is created so that it equals one if and only if 
the person was currently self-employed, but was a wage worker in the previous year. For 
example, selfe equals one if a person was self-employed in 2000 (Wave 3), but was a 
wage worker in 1999 (Wave 2). The reason for constructing this variable is to focus on 
the transition from wage employment to self-employment. 
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